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komunikowanych eksplicytnie polega na pragmatycznym wzbogaceniu odkodowanej 






i  Jary’ego	 (2016),	 artykuł	przedstawia	dodatkowe	argumenty	przeciwko	modelowaniu	





eksplikatura,  implikatura,	 rozumienie	 wypowiedzi,	 wzbogacenie	 pragmatyczne,	 war-









The	 structure	of	 the	paper	 is	 as	 follows.	The	concept	of	 explicature	 as	
developed	within	 the	 leading	pragmatic	models	 is	characterised	first	 (sec-





the main points made.
2.  Explicitly communicated meaning:  
Grice (1967/89), Sperber and Wilson (1986/95),  
Bach (1994), Recanati (2004)
It	is	largely	agreed	by	pragmaticists	of	various	persuasions	that	the	mean-
ing	conveyed	and	recovered	in	verbal	exchanges	involves	two	distinct	lay-
ers, that is explicit and implicit content, with the issue of where and on what 
grounds the borderline between these two should be drawn remaining con-
troversial	and	debatable	(Carston	2004b;	Chaves	2010).	It	is	the	explicit	side	
of	verbal	communication	that	is	in	focus	here.
Strangely enough, while it might appear that scrutinizing what is expli-
citly	conveyed,	as	more	direct	and	specific,	would	be	less	problematic	and	
more	straightforward	than	dealing	with	implicit	import,	surveying	the	scene	





of communication has been adequately described and explained, and there 
are	a number	of	accounts	competing	for	primacy	in	this	area.1	The	roots	of	
the	problem	with	explicit	meaning	go	back	to	Grice	(1967/89),	for	whom	the	
division	of	utterance	meaning	into	what is said and what is implicated was 
instrumental	for	his	working	out	schema	for	implicatures.	Since	Grice’s	ma-
jor goal was to explain how implicatures arose, his concern with the explicit 
layer	of	communication	was	only	tangential	to	this	objective,	hence	not	ex-
plored	at	depth,	causing	a lot	of	debate	over	how	the	notion	of	what is said 
should	 be	 understood.	 In	 effect,	 disputes	 over	 how	Grice	 approached	 ex-
plicit	meaning	continue	(see	e.g.,	Baptista	2011;	Saul	2002;	Terkourafi	2009;	
Wharton	2002).
However	much	 disagreement	 there	 has	 been	 over	 what	 exactly	 Grice	
meant by what is said, most commentators emphasize that his construal of 
explicit	meaning	is	minimally	contextual,	since	it	embraces	a decoded	input	





Iten	 2005;	Levinson	2000;	Petrus	 2010;	 Sperber	 and	Wilson	1986/95,	 2005;	
Wilson	and	Sperber	2012).	This	kind	of	model	allows	for	a clear-cut	division	
between	explicit	and	implicit	utterance	meaning,	with	what is said	by	defi-
nition reduced to what is encoded, supplemented, when required, by disam-
biguation and reference assignment to be determined contextually. What is 
implicated	is	assumed	to	be	derived	inferentially	on	the	basis	of	the	maxims	
of	conversation	(Carston	2002a:	22).
However	 elegant,	neat	 and	attractive	 it	might	 appear,	 this	 approach	 is	
fraught with problems. If, as Grice insists, what is said should necessar-
ily	 fall	within	what	 the	 speaker	 actually	means	 (or	 as	 the	 author	 puts	 it,	
“M-intends,”	where	 “M”	 stands	 for	meaning,	Grice	 1968/89:	 123),	 defining	
saying	in	this	manner	creates	problems	in	a number	of	cases	in	which	what	
is communicated departs considerably from what is said in the Gricean 
sense. In particular, non-literal uses of language, in which speakers com-
monly	do	not	mean	what	they	actually	say,	are	difficult	to	reconcile	with	this	
1 For	a comprehensive	survey	on	implicature	research,	see	Zufferey	et	al.	(2019),	and	for	









Apart from the fact that this kind of solution spoils the neatness of the 
model,	introducing	another	category	in	the	meaning	conveyed	by	the	speak-
er,	who	– as	 is	 stipulated	– may	not	 just	 say	but	also	“make	as	 if	 to	say”	
something,	it	appears	problematic	in	many	ways.	The	Gricean	defining	cri-









non-inferential treatment of what is said, at the same time destroying what 
was	supposed	to	be	a clear-cut	division	between	the	explicit	and	implicit	im-
port	of	utterances.
Rejecting the idea that what speakers communicate explicitly is gener-
ated	non-inferentially,	Sperber	and	Wilson	 (1986/95)	posit	 that	 the	 logical	
form, automatically returned by the language parser, being an incomplete 
(i.e.	non-truth-evaluable)	conceptual	representation,	is	inferentially	adjust-
ed, completed and enriched by the hearer to full propositional forms, which 












etc.,	 and	 they	are	 (relatively)	uncontroversial,	 since	 they	are	 linguistically	
licensed.	The	latter,	i.e.	free	pragmatic	processes	are	not	sanctioned	in	this	







puting explicatures come in two forms, namely as meaning modulation and 




just the meaning of lovely	to	get	the	intended	interpretation:	in	this	example,	
taken	from	the	novel	The Da Vinci Code,2 the intended referent of she is the 












(2)	 (a)	 	MARYX	 DID	 NOT	 PASS	 ENOUGH	 UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS	 
TO QUALIFY FOR ADMISSION TO SECOND-YEAR STUDY AND, AS 
A RESULT,	MARYX	CANNOT	CONTINUE	WITH UNIVERSITY STUDY.3
(b)		Mary is not feeling happy		 (Carston	2004b:	635)
There	is	a substantial	amount	of	conceptual	material,	highlighted	in	bold	in	
(2a),	added	in	the	process	of	free	enrichment	of	what	Y is	supposed	to	com-
municate explicitly. In fact, it is not just the number of enhancements in-
troduced	that	is	worrying:	there	is	a whole	array	of	possible	additions	like,	
for	instance,	those	in	(3a)‒(3d),	each	producing	a proposition	with	different	





(3)	 (a)			MARYX	DID	NOT	PASS	ENOUGH	COURSE	UNITS	REQUIRED BY THE 
UNIVERSITY TO BE ABLE TO ENTER SECOND-YEAR STUDY AND, 
AS A  RESULT,	 MARYX	 CANNOT	 CONTINUE	 WITH THE STUDIES 
THAT MARYX HAS UNDERTAKEN.5 
(b)			MARYX	 DID	 NOT	 PASS	 ENOUGH	 UNIVERSITY COURSE	 UNITS	 RE-
QUIRED OF YEAR ONE STUDENTS AND, AS A RESULT,	MARYX CAN-
NOT	CONTINUE	WITH STUDYING CHEMISTRY.
(c)			MARYX	DID	NOT	PASS	ENOUGH	UNIVERSITY COURSE	UNITS	THAT 
WERE OBLIGATORY FOR YEAR ONE STUDENTS AND, AS A  RE-
SULT,	MARYX	CANNOT	CONTINUE	STUDYING CHEMISTRY.
(d)			MARYX	 DID	NOT	 PASS	 ENOUGH	COMPULSORY COURSE	 UNITS	AT 
YEAR ONE AND, AS A RESULT,	MARYX	CANNOT	CONTINUE	WITH 
MARYX’S TERTIARY EDUCATION.





major reason for calling it in this way being that what the speaker commu-
nicates is in fact implicit in what is being said, so as the author emphasizes, 
remains	inexplicit	(Bach	2007,	2012).
Content-wise	Bach’s	impliciture	is	not	different	from	the	relevance-theo-
retic explicature, with two processes that the researcher posits to be respon-
sible	for	getting	the	explicitly	communicated	import,	namely	completion	and	











literature, which will not be reported here as they go well beyond the scope of this paper. For 
this	reason,	I do	not	dispute	the	meaning	of	and	in	any	way	and	stick	to	Carston’s	(2004b)	
idea in this respect.
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it	may	be	contextually	obvious	that	steel	will	not	be	strong	enough	to	sup-





communicated by the speaker. It is manifestly false that the speaker liter-
ally	has	nothing	to	wear	and	in	order	to	arrive	at	what	is	really	meant,	ex-
pansion,	which	involves	conceptual	strengthening	(Bach	1994:	134),	is	nec-
essary.	So	 in	a certain	context	 it	may	be	apparent	 that	by	uttering	(5)	 the	
speaker means that she has nothing appropriate to wear to the wedding she 
is	about	to	attend.6
The	major	difference	between	completion	and	expansion	is	that	while	the	
former is called for to turn proposition radicals into full propositions, so it is 
conceptually	required,	the	latter	results	in	fine-tuning	of	a minimal	propo-
sition	as	expressed	by	the	utterance,	hence	is	just	pragmatically	mandated	
(Bach	1994,	2012).7 Both entail adding extra components into the decoded 
form, so they are par excellence enrichments.





generating what is said, or the so-called primary meaning, are assumed to 
be	associative	in	nature	(see	Carston	2007).	This	means	that	on	Recanati’s	



































constituents not represented in the linguistic structure of the sentence in or-
der	to	arrive	at	the	explicit	import	conveyed.	It	is	contested	as	unmotivated	










which	everybody	 invited	 is	known	 to	 like	and	appreciate	 their	mother	 in	
answer	to	a suggestion	about	inviting	another	guest,	Sally,	it	will	not	(and	
cannot)	be	understood	as	communicating	(7a),	even	though	the	existence	of	






























Some	 other	 opponents	 of	 free	 enrichment,	 Corazza	 and	 Dokic	 (2007,	
2012),	 eliminate	 the	 procedure	 altogether,	 advancing	 a  model	 of	 situated	
minimalism or situationalism, as they call it. Instead of freely enriched ex-
plicatures,	Corazza	and	Dokic	 (2007,	2012)	postulate	situational	anchoring	













beer in the fridge in the situation of u.	(Corazza	and	Dokic	2012:	187)
As	Corazza	and	Dokic	(2007,	2012)	point	out,	unlike	free	enrichment,	which	
allows	the	 identification	of	 the	meaning	directly	conveyed	by	the	speaker	





situations in which interactants happen to be functioning rather than to re-
side	 in	 the	discussants’	minds	 (Corazza	and	Dokic	2007:	175).	On	this	ap-





commitments are mainly philosophical, it can only be expected that psycho-
logical plausibility of the framework will not be high on their agenda, so it is 
not one of their concerns.
Nevertheless	Corazza	and	Dokic	(2007:	175)	do	spotlight	an	acute	prob-










eter	 is	 the	 reflection	 that	no	 enrichment	 can	ever	be	 satisfactory.	As	was	
aptly	argued	by	Wettstein	(1979)	long	ago,	any	attempt	to	make	underdeter-
mined	aspects	of	an	utterance	fully	explicit	is	bound	to	fail.	As	the	author	
underscores, there will always be competing and non-synonymous ways to 
express	the	specific	meaning,	and	even	the	speaker,	if	asked	to	choose	the	
one that best corresponds to the meaning that is aimed at, may not be ready 
to	decide.	“The	speaker	will	often	be	aware	of	several	descriptions,	each	of	
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which uniquely picks out his referent, and will not be able to select one of 
these descriptions as the correct one, the one that captures what he meant 








no principled means of choosing the intended one. Since they are not truth-
conditionally	equivalent,	 the	different	versions	 constitute	different	propo-
sitions,	 and	 in	 consequence,	 different	 explicatures.	That	 is	 a  fatal	 blow	 to	
theories	of	verbal	communication	which	rely	on	enrichment	as	an	explica-
ture-generating	pragmatic	process.	It	should	be	stressed	then,	that	overgen-
eration, but of the type just described and not the kind allegedly detected by 
the	endorsers	of	hidden	indexicals,	is	indeed	a problem	for	free	enrichment.
4. Against explicatures 












































some	of	 the	 enumerated	 functions	may	not	 accurately	 reflect	what	 is	 as-
sumed	to	be	involved,	since,	for	example,	nowhere	is	it	claimed	in	relevance	
theory	that	explicatures	embrace	“the	first	content	hearers	recover	via	rel-





determined, and hearers may not need to work out propositionally complete 





municated framed as it is in the leading pragmatic theories, neither war-
rants	the	adequate	identification	of	content	for	truth-value	judgements	nor	
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allows for establishing clear conditions under which speakers might be held 
responsible	for	what	they	have	asserted.	Borg’s	overall	conclusion	is	that	ex-
plicature	is	an	ill-defined	notion,	“explanatorily	otiose”	(Borg	2016:	352)	and	





in	consequence,	some	repetition	 (and	redundancy)	 in	 the	criticism	she	di-




















in most pragmatic models to treat these two as belonging to the same spe-
cies	of	phenomena.	As	Jary	(2016:	26)	contends,	“utterances	are	events	that	
consist	 in	 the	production	of	 tokens	of	 linguistic	 types	 for	 communicative	
purposes,	and	interpretations	are	constraints	on	behaviour,	verbal	or	other-
wise,	that	result	from	those	utterances.	In	the	case	of	an	assertion,	the	con-
straints can be thought of as inferential and practical commitments and en-





what	 is	 asserted,	 (ii)	 that	 the	 scope	 test	 advocated	by	 some	pragmaticists	
(e.g.,	Carston	2002a;	Recanati	1989)	to	differentiate	the	aspects	of	utterance	
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with	 the	spirit	of	 Jary’s	criticism	and	find	his	 ideas	on	the	distinction	be-
tween	utterances	and	their	interpretations	quite	inspiring.








with	 the	 critique	of	 explicatures	presented	 in	 Jodłowiec	 (2015).	The	back-
bone	of	the	criticism	levelled	against	explicature	in	this	monograph	has	to	





cover	 as	 conversationally	 pertinent	 content	 may	 not	 necessarily	 involve	
the	retrieval	of	explicature	in	the	form	of	a complete	proposition.	As	an	ex-






not necessarily engage in full syntactic, semantic and/or pragmatic analyses 
of	incoming	verbal	data,	and	often	end	up	with	incomplete	meaning	repre-
sentations.
It must be pointed out that this perfectly accords with the orientation to 
optimally	 relevant	 interpretations	as	professed	within	 the	 relevance-theo-
retic	framework.	It	is	assumed	on	this	approach	that	the	chief	driving	force	








ence to explicatures, which are in focus here, this kind of shallow processing 
may be predicted to be enacted particularly in situations where the locus of 
meaning	conveyed	in	a given	communicative	context	lies	beyond	the	explicit	





In	 order	 to	understand	 that	Y’s	 answer	 to	X’s	 suggestion	 is	negative,	 the	






can	proceed	without	the	proper	precisification	of	what	Sally’s text actually 
stands	for.	As	shown	elsewhere	(Jodłowiec	and	Piskorska	2015,	2020),	this	






vised	by	Deirdre	Wilson),	 in	 relevance	 theory	 implicatures	 are	warranted	
only	by	fully	inferentially	developed	explicatures.	This	means	that	shallow	










earlier	 (Jodłowiec	2015),	which	Borg	was	unaware	of,	 in	order	 to	 remove	
the	cognitive	burden	that	enrichment	as	the	explicature-generating	device	
is	recognized	to	cause.	My	proposal	is	the	comprehension	model	embracing	





What	 Jary’s	 (2016)	 deliberations	 over	 the	 status	 and	 purpose	 of	 expli-
catures	bring	to	light	is	the	juxtaposition	between	utterances	and	their	in-

















conceptual entities. To be sure, we know next to nothing about the language 
of	thought	(or	mentalese)	and	the	only	language	that	we	can	use	to	elucidate	




tive	objects)	 they	are	associated	with.	Now	that	 this	 issue	has	been	made	
clear,	contextual	cognitive	fix	can	be	discussed	in	some	more	detail.
Unlike	enrichment,	which	adds	conceptual	material	to	the	decoded	rep-
resentation,	 contextual	 cognitive	fix	 is	 assumed	 to	 operate	 at	 the	 level	 of	
the	 language	 of	 thought,	 performing	 contextual	 meaning	 fine-tuning	 or	
what	 can	 roughly	be	 viewed	 as	meaning	modulation,	which	 corroborates	
11 In	inverted	commas,	because	as	argued	above,	full	linguistic	explicitness	is	unattainable.
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Borg’s	(2016)	suggestions.	The	underlying	claim	is	that	in	the	same	way	in	
which	 the	 speaker’s	 thought	which	 triggers	 a  given	 utterance	 is	 an	 indi-
viduated	 cognitive	 representation	 in	her	mind,	 so	 is	 the	 thought	 that	 the	
hearer	forms	as	the	result	of	processing	her	utterance,	both	being	mentalese	






All this means that if communication is successful, the concepts that orig-
inate	in	the	speaker’s	mind	will	also	– as	a result	of	utterance	processing	– be	







Tower	is	lovely	not	because	the	addressee	will	substitute	the Eiffel Tower for 
she,	but	thanks	to	the	recipient’s	capacity	to	identify	the	intended	entity	I am	






the	speaker	 in	context	 (hence	the	term	contextual cognitive fix).	The	sche-
matic	representation	of	the	meaning	recovered	might	be	something	like	(13).
(12)	 She	didn’t	pass	enough	units	and	can’t	continue.	

















formationally	 exact”	 (to	 borrow	 the	 convenient	 phrase	 from	Vicente	 and	
Martínez-Manrique	2005:	551)	language	of	thought	formulas.
This	kind	of	modelling	of	explicatures	eliminates	the	troublesome	enrich-


















comprehension.	The	 linguistic	 adjustment/enhancement	 approaches	 have	
been	challenged	on	the	grounds	of	cognitive	inefficiency	(since	adding	con-








thought representation is in force.





eliminates	 the	 proliferation	 of	 truth-conditionally	 different	 candidates	 for	
explicature.	It	is	also	compatible	with	the	idea	that	utterance	interpretations	
may	be,	and	frequently	are,	sketchy,	and	the	stage	of	a complete	proposi-
tional representation of explicitly communicated content is sometimes by-
passed	if	satisfying	cognitive	effects	can	be	recovered	taking	a shorter	(and	
more	economical)	comprehension	route.
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